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REPORT OF
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
27th INFANTRY DIVISION
SAIPAN OPERATION



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by authority of AC of S, G-2, WDGS

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HEADQUARTERS 27TH INFANTRY DIVISION
A.P.O. 27

15 September 1944.

SUBJECT: Report of G-2 activities, FORAGER Operation, with Recommendations.

TO : Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division.

1. Submitted herewith is the report of Intelligence Activities with Recommendations for the FORAGER Operation. Period covered is from 1 April 1944 to 6 August 1944 inclusive.

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SECTION 1
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PLANNING PHASE - 1 APRIL TO 31 MAY, 1944

A. PREPARATION OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE.

1. GENERAL.

a. As the 27th Infantry Division was designated as the floating reserve for the Expeditionary Force (TF 51), it was necessary that all elements be prepared to land on any one of the three objectives, SAIPAN, TINIAN, or GUAM. In addition, there was little possibility of elements being reassembled once the transport divisions departed from PEARL HARBOR. Therefore, it was necessary that each transport division and ship therein, be self sufficient in maps and intelligence information. Dissemination of maps and intelligence information was based on this situation.

2. INFORMATION AGENCIES.

a. Three (3) principle agencies were available for combat intelligence information

JICPOA, including PRISIC
Hq. 5th Amphibious Force
Hq. V Amphibious Corps

The first named, JICPOA, was by far the most valuable of these agencies. The facilities at the call of this headquarters plus the personnel available, made them the primary source of intelligence information. In one phase, that of aerial photo interpretation, all three headquarters participated but without coordination. The result was that the Division was flooded with "G-2 situation maps" to an extent that intelligence personnel were swamped with interpretations which often varied to a great degree.

b. G-2 Section, CPA, was available for assistance on call and aided materially in supplying maps for the training cruises to MAUI as the G-2 section, V Phib Corps, did not participate in training but devoted itself entirely to combat intelligence efforts.

c. Organization of XXIV Army Corps was accomplished at too late a date to be of material assistance.

3. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

a. Headquarters, 27th Infantry Division, was situated in quadrangle I, Schofield Barracks. When the Division Headquarters moved into this location, AC of S, G-2 emphasized the need of security rooms to be available on assignment of the Division to an operation. This plan had been approved and

two rooms were available when the Forager Operation was ordered. One room was reserved as a planning room for officers and particularly for the use of G-3; the other room, for maps and other intelligence data and as a work room for preparation of overlays, relief models, and such.

b. From previous experience it was recognized that officer courier service between headquarters is necessary if complete security is to be accomplished during the planning phase of an operation. Higher headquarters achieve a degree of security due to the number of plans being worked upon by them but direction of information on a particular area to a particular unit, quickly identifies that unit's mission. In addition to this, it has been felt that some higher headquarters, particularly those of naval association, are not as security conscious as army personnel. Officer courier service was therefore established between all headquarters involved and in addition, AC of S, G-2, made almost daily calls at JICPOA and on the intelligence officers of Force and Corps. The calls made by G-2 were responsible for hastening dissemination of information and data from the higher links in the chain of command, on occasions by as much as a week.

c. Complete security within the Division is known to have existed until the training cruises were commenced. At that time, frequent mention of ultimate destination, as well as other possible objectives, became noticeable among Division personnel with emphasis on the MARIANAS. Investigation disclosed that the subject was freely discussed among the navy enlisted men and that our men received their information from this source during the cruises. Because of this, increased attention was given to possible leaks of information. It is a credit to the personnel of the Division and to their security training that not one case of "blabbing" was reported.

d. Division shoulder patches were ordered removed as of May 10th. Comment: In future operations, if removal of patches is necessary, it would appear more advisable to do so by organization and at varying times or immediately before embarkation.

e. The fact that POW interrogations and captured documents show no knowledge of our proposed landing on SAIPAN until our fleet began its bombardment, appears proof that the security net surrounding the operation was not broken by the enemy.

4. MAPS and LITHOMOSAICS:

a. Types of maps provided for the operation consisted of:

- (1) 1/20000 topographic with 1000 yard numbered target squares superimposed thereon. In turn, the 1000 yard squares were broken into 25 - 200 yard squares numbered from A thru Y. Comment: This map, while not favorably accepted at first, was generally agreed to as very satisfactory by the close of the operation. The method of target designation proved a rapid means of reporting locations. Most common sug-

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gestion made is that if the system is to be continued, all personnel should be trained to break the 200 yard lettered square mentally into quarters numbered 1 thru 4, thereby making point targets more exact in location. Example:

Point X, now reported as in TA 123 A, would be given as TA 123 A2.

A ^X	B	C	D	E	A
F	G	H	I	J	F
K	L	M	N	O	K
	1	2	3		124

The chief criticism of the target square system is the possibility of location of point targets by coordinate system being disregarded for the easier method. The target square system is excellent when using the shackle code.

- (2) 1/62500 topographic without target squares was found of value for orientation purposes primarily.
- (3) General.
 - (a) Maps were very accurate considering the sources from which they were produced (captured enemy maps and aerial photographs). However, they did not bring out the particularly rugged nature of the terrain and there were instances when terrain features were out of line. This latter was particularly apparent when our map was compared with an enemy terrain map taken during the operation. Amazement was expressed by an officer POW on seeing our map and it was thought by him to have been made after our capture of the island.
 - (b) A desire for a 1/10000 map for staff use only and for distribution down to and including battalions staffs has been expressed.

b. Litho-mosaics of SAIPAN were not satisfactory. Reasons for this were twofold: many cloud covered areas and the fact that they were produced from photographs taken some months prior to D Day. Paper on which mosaics were lithographed gave poor results. Mosaics of TINIAN, received but not used, were much better. Good mosaics are definitely needed.

c. Distribution.

- (1) 1/20000 - SAIPAN, TINIAN, ROTA, GUAM: To squad leaders.
1/62500 - SAIPAN, TINIAN, GUAM: To platoon leaders.
Litho-mosaics - SAIPAN: To company commanders with increased distribution to Division Artillery.
- (2) To accomplish the above distribution to division and attached units, the following quantities of maps were requested and received:

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1/20000 - 3500
1/62500 - 1250
Litho-mosaics - 850

When consideration is given to the fact that the SAIPAN 1/20000 maps and mosaics consisted of 5 sheets each; TINIAN, 4; ROTA, 4; and GUAM, 11, an idea will be gained of the undertaking necessary to distribute the maps in accordance with the details listed in par. d, below. In addition to this vast quantity of paper, there were many "G-2 Situation Maps" received from higher headquarters in quantities of 75, 150, or 300, which received special distribution according to quantity.

- (3) General: Survey conducted following the operation showed that distribution was satisfactory throughout the Division except that engineer units report they require twice the allotted issue.

d. Method of distribution.

- (1) As previously noted, it was necessary that each ship be self sufficient in maps for each objective prior to departure from PEARL HARBOR. This necessitated allotment of maps based on the sailing list for each ship. G-2 section personnel counted out the maps to meet the requirements of each transport division (105, 106, and 165th Inf and Division Artillery) and placed them in the hands of the regimental S-2's and D/A S-2 commencing approximately two weeks prior to departure and as the sheets were received. In turn S-2's broke the maps down in their secret operation rooms to fit the needs of each ship. All maps were double wrapped in sealed packages which were not opened until two (2) hours after sailing. (NOTE: This practice was observed with all intelligence data). Maps required by the Division Headquarters were similarly handled but by representatives of the G-2 section.

Comment: The system was satisfactory except as follows:

- (a) Distribution of 1/20000 maps to squad leaders on board ship was made too early and maps were, in many cases, in poor condition on arrival at destination, thereby requiring issue of reserve maps. It is believed that a limited issue for study during the voyage is better with a final issue made shortly prior to the day of landing.

- (b) There were cases where detachments which of necessity were scattered thru the trans-divs did not receive

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their full allotment of maps.

5. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS.

a. General. Aerial photographs were slow in arrival at first. First pictures received of SAIPAN and TINIAN were of 23 February 1944. Pictures of the same island taken during April were the next received. GUAM pictures arrived in April and May.

b. Distribution. Photographs were usually received in sets of four (4) of 4-5 sorties, varying in scale and with obliques and verticals included. As distribution was necessary between five headquarters (Div, 3 Inf Regts, and D/A), the quantity received was not satisfactory. Comment: 1/10000 vertical (focal length 24", altitude 20000) proved most satisfactory. Obliques, except for YORK 9-C, Feb 23, 1944, were found of little value as they were taken from such great distances. Only one complete coverage of SAIPAN and TINIAN was received. The value of either type of picture naturally increases as the altitude from which taken becomes less.

c. Requests for vertical and oblique pictures of selected areas on SAIPAN and TINIAN were submitted on several occasions as their need became necessary in planning.

6. RELIEF MODELS.

a. Previous experience had proved the value of relief models of objectives. This was recognized by Naval Headquarters and all ships requiring the models were so provided. A similar situation was not recognized in regard to Army forces involved. Request for eighteen (18) models of the objective (one for each transport) was made by the Division Commander shortly after the information was received that the Division would participate in the operation. Reply was to the effect that one model would be available to the Division and that not until just prior to sailing. This obstacle was met by construction of a model of SAIPAN and another of TINIAN by personnel of the G-2 section. When security measures permitted, personnel of infantry regiments and of the D/A were advised as to methods of construction and similar models were made, in some cases, during the movement to the objective. For preliminary planning and orientation of troops, relief models are invaluable. Large scale models of landing beaches would have been of great value but since there was no certainty as to where the Division would land and time did not permit, these were not constructed.

7. INTELLIGENCE ANNEX AND G-2 STUDIES.

a. As operation plans rather than field orders were all that could be prepared, an Intelligence Annex was published which could become part of a field order without change. Capabilities and Reconnaissance Missions were added as addendas as additional plans were developed. Enemy capabilities, although not part of the prescribed form, were included in the Intelligence Annex and Addendas because past experience in doing so had proved of justifiable value.

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G-2 studies of SAIPAN, TINIAN, and GUAM were made appendices to the Intelligence Annex and published in sufficient quantities to receive ample distribution for orientation of troops on each ship. 750 copies of the studies were prepared.

8. LANGUAGE TEAM.

a. Although the number of language personnel (one officer and ten (10) enlisted men) was recognized as insufficient for the requirements of an Infantry Division, the following distribution of the men was made and proved the best solution possible.

Div Hq	1 officer	4	enlisted men
105th Inf		2	" "
106th Inf		2	" "
165th Inf		2	" "

The Division group moved in two sections during the sea voyage and reassembled on landing. Shortly thereafter it was necessary to send two of the men to assist the Division Civil Affairs Officer until Garrison Force language personnel became available, a period of approximately three weeks.

9. CIVIL AFFAIRS.

a. Although Northern Task and Landing Force Headquarters included a Civil Affairs Section, divisions were considered responsible for the handling of civilians until they were turned over to NTLF. The Marine Division staffs included Civil Affairs officers. The Judge Advocate General of the 27th Inf Division was assigned this work in addition to his other duties. G-2 assisted the Division Civil Affairs officer in drawing up plans for the removal of civilians taken into custody as the Division advanced and for the questioning of key civilians on intelligence matters.

10. INTELLIGENCE RADIO NET.

a. Based on previous experience, authority was requested and granted for the formation of an intelligence radio net. Unavailability of radio sets necessitated two nets including:

(1) Div G-2, Regimental S-2's, Div Com'r, and Div OP.
(SCR 509 sets).

(2) Reg't and Bn S-2's (SCR 300 sets).

Comment: This net proved its worth in full, particularly during the first days of the operation, and in many instances was of use to the Division G-3 as well. Radio communication between the Div OP and Div CP was absolutely necessary as in more than one case, wire communications would not have been available in time and the delay entailed by messenger service would have decreased the value of information materially.

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11. CENSORSHIP.

a. Approximately 30 days prior to departure, the following censorship restrictions were imposed.

- (1) Use of APO 27 only by personnel of the Division. Attached units were required to collect mail of their personnel and forward it to Theater Censor, CPA, specially marked.
- (2) Trans-Pacific and inter-island telephone calls were limited to emergency calls only.
- (3) SCM cables were limited to emergencies but EFM privileges were more liberal. However, all EFM's were examined to insure that messages made sense and that code by use of EFM numbers was not possible.

b. Arrangements were made with Theater Censor, CPA, that the same theater censorship personnel review Division and attached unit mail during the entire period in order that special restrictions would not be overlooked.

12. PUBLIC RELATIONS.

a. Approximately one month prior to departure, an additional officer was attached to the G-2 section to handle the public relations problems of the Division. He was assisted by one man taken from the Special Service section who had had limited press experience. This action was authorized after the Division had been canvassed for experienced newspaper men without success. Both men were attached to the Public Relations Section, CPA, for instruction, contacts, information as to naval censorship restrictions (all press releases of the operation necessitated final naval approval), and plans of transmission of press releases for publication.

b. Several correspondents, designated to accompany the Division, were invited to visit the Division in order to meet key officers and to become acquainted with the Division history and its units. These men spent several days making their visits and becoming familiar with the units, officers, and background of the Division prior to departure. Pictures were taken in many cases, for distribution after the Division's participation in the action was announced.

c. The public relations question is discussed in detail in Annex "A" attached to this report.

13. OWI.

a. It is realized that OWI activities may not be considered as preparations for an operation but in this case, they had an indirect effect.

b. During April, several conferences were held which included representatives from the G-2 office CPA, 27th Inf Div, the OWI office in Honolulu, and Mr. Owen Latimore, Washington OWI representative. Subjects

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discussed were primarily the use and contents of propaganda leaflets and radio broadcasts.

c. Propaganda broadcasts were prepared by the Division language section in order that well thought out and carefully constructed messages would be available at any time during combat when broadcasting was possible by a public address system. These broadcasts were carried by each of the Division language personnel. Comment: During conferences it was emphasized that propaganda should be prepared or at least reviewed by personnel of Japanese birth in order that the proper psychology be used. That this is necessary appears confirmed by prisoners of war who criticized propaganda leaflets prepared by NTLF language Personnel (Caucasian) and approved the broadcast wording prepared by the 27th Division Language Team (Nisei).

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B. TRAINING PREPARATION.

1. GENERAL. Intelligence training was reorganized following the GILBERT ISLANDS Operation with particular emphasis on subjects considered essential as a result of this operation and later, the experiences of the 7th Division and elements of the 27th Division in the MARSHALLS.

2. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

a. In addition to the intelligence personnel provided in tables of organizations it was required that a minimum of two (2) men from each combat infantry company be designated as combat intelligence men and trained for one week out of each five with a battalion intelligence section or the regimental I & R platoon. Purpose was to provide understudies for T/O intelligence personnel in case of casualties and to increase the flow of intelligence information from front line units.

Comment: The theory was good but was not a success from the replacement angle. One of the two men selected was usually the company communication sergeant and the other in almost every case, an excellent man whom the company commander eventually used as a combat leader replacement. Reports of information due to the scheme showed little improvement and will be discussed under the Operation Phase of this report.

3. TRAINING OF T/O INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL.

a. Map reading: included memorizing maps, photo interpretation symbols, Japanese maps, and Japanese map symbols. Personnel of the G-2 section prepared a booklet on Japanese signs and symbols to assist in Japanese map reading. 500 of these booklets were distributed.

b. Instruction in aerial photograph interpretation.

c. Observation.

d. Scouting and patrolling

e. Sketching.

f. Message writing.

g. Interrogation of prisoners.

h. Familiarization with common Japanese documents.

i. CP Exercises.

4. TRAINING OF ALL DIVISION PERSONNEL.

a. Security training by lectures.

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b. Intelligence orientation lectures.

c. Identification of aircraft by attendance at navy schools. Renshaw system was used.

d. Instruction in Japanese phrases. 10,000 cards containing simple phrases were distributed through the Division and pronunciation was taught by personnel of the G-2 language section. Troops report several occasions when the cards and instruction proved their value during the operation.

e. Familiarization with common Japanese weapons by scheduling the Division weapons collection to units with sufficient time for units to allow personnel to make a study of these weapons.

f. Processing and questioning of POWs. This instruction was given in a three (3) act play produced by personnel of the G-2 section and language team and illustrating the right and wrong methods.

5. SPECIAL TRAINING.

a. Intelligence school. All S-2's and senior intelligence enlisted personnel were required to attend a Division intelligence school which totalled 20 hours. Instruction was in the nature of a refresher course and was accomplished by lecture and practical work. Navy personnel from the intelligence officers of 5th Phib Force and V Phib Corps were invited to attend this school. Invitation was accepted by the former Headquarters which sent ten (10) officers to take the course.

b. Division language school. Realizing that the Division language team was insufficient to fill the demands of an infantry division in combat, a canvass of the Division was made to find personnel who were familiar enough with the Japanese language to receive instruction in Japanese combat phrases. Two instruction groups, each of approximately ten (10) students, were selected:

- (1) The Caucasian group who were given instruction in speaking.
- (2) A group of Chinese ancestry who were instructed in reading as well as speaking the language. Each group met for four (4) hours, three (3) days a week for six (6) weeks.

Comment: The results of this school were most satisfactory during the operation. Students were used at POW collecting points and in the front lines, to make limited interrogations and translations of documents. There were also instances when they made successful appeals to enemy individuals and groups to surrender. It is believed that an additional six weeks of training for this personnel would have provided the Division with a language group capable of performing simple language section duties. However, the group can never be a substitute for a trained language team. (NOTE: It must be recognized that these language students did not start from scratch

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but had had previous instruction at the University of Hawaii or elsewhere, or could read and speak Chinese. All students were required to meet a definite level of knowledge in the Japanese language before being accepted for the Division school.

c. Division Reconnaissance Troop.

- (1) The Reconnaissance Troop was definitely recognized as an intelligence agency. As such its training was directed by G-3 after conferences with G-2. All of the subjects listed in par B 3 and 4 above ("Training of T/O Intelligence Personnel" and "Training of all Division Personnel") were included in the training of the troop. One officer and a key noncommissioned officer attended the Division intelligence school and one enlisted man was enrolled in each of the two language school classes.
- (2) With knowledge that lack of shipping would prevent transportation of the majority of the troop's mechanized vehicles, particular emphasis was placed on foot patrolling.
- (3) Early in the planning stages, it became apparent that reconnaissance of beaches might be necessary. While not equipped or trained for such work, special instruction in this phase was prescribed for the troop and included familiarization with hydrographic terms and conditions, use of rubber boats, and two days of training in landing by rubber boats from a destroyer both in daylight and darkness.

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SECTION II

MOVEMENT PHASE - 1-16 JUNE, 1944

1. Maps and intelligence data were broken out and distribution commenced two (2) hours after ships departed from PEARL HARBOR.

2. Orientation was commenced on the second day out and continued until arrival at destination. The general method of orientation was as follows:

a. Lectures by intelligence officers to assembled officers on each ship covering conditions of possible landing beaches, terrain, enemy strength, native population, sanitary and health conditions, and such. In turn, company officers presented similar lectures to their troops.

b. Intensive study of maps and relief models where available with the objective that all personnel would be thoroughly acquainted with the general terrain situation.

c. On some ships, Command Post Exercises were held covering each probable plan of landing. These exercises also afforded an opportunity to familiarize all with the communication nets to be used.

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SECTION III

OPERATIONS PHASE - 16 JUNE TO 9 JULY 1944

1. GENERAL.

a. For the movement to SAIPAN, the G-2 section was divided into two teams. One team with the AC of S, G-2, accompanied the Division Commanding General on the FREMONT and one team was with the Assistant Division Commander on the CAVALIER. Late in the afternoon of 16 June, the Assistant Division Commander as directed to land on SAIPAN to coordinate the commitment of the Division. He took with him a small staff in which was included the Ass't G-2 and two enlisted men from the G-2 section.

b. Contact was made with the Headquarters of the 4th Marine Division to which the first units of the 27th Division to be landed were to be attached. The Ass't G-2 conferred with the D-2 of the Marine Division to obtain all the information of the enemy known at that time. A copy of their periodic report was obtained and estimates of the situation received. Early in the morning of 17 June, the G-2 came ashore and remained the rest of the day with the D-2 of the 4th Marine Division. At this time, the 165th Infantry with a few elements of the 105th Infantry were the only units which had landed and they had been attached to the Marine Division. Therefore, the primary job of the Division Headquarters was to prepare itself for the future employment of the Division on the right of the Marines.

c. The Marine Division had very little information of the enemy on its immediate front at this early stage. The Division had received large concentrations of artillery fire while landing and had progressed about 400 yards inland. As a result, little definite information of the enemy strength or dispositions could be obtained.

2. G-2 SECTION - OPERATION AND PROCEDURE.

a. As noted above, for the movement to SAIPAN, the G-2 section had been divided into two groups. These groups were both self-sufficient as each contained an intelligence sergeant, stenographer, draftsman, photo interpreter, and an intelligence enlisted man. For a forward displacement of the Division Command Post, this breakdown continued with either one team or the other accompanying the Ass't G-2 to the new CP. This forward group set up the Command Post tent and made all the initial preparations. When communications were established, G-2 closed the old CP and there was no break in the functioning of the section. Two 1/4 ton vehicles and one trailer were available to the section for all moves as a general rule. The men were transported in a 2 1/2-ton truck or a DUKW.

b. Early in the operation, the second Ass't G-2 was wounded and thereafter the section functioned with only two officers. The enlisted personnel of the section were divided into groups of four and schedules observed to

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provide ample opportunity for rest. The four men on duty included a stenographer, who kept the journal and typed messages, a draftsman, who kept the map posted, a clerk, and a senior sergeant, who supervised activities and kept the work sheet. This system functioned extremely well and provided for 24 hour continual operation of the section.

c. With regard to the actions of the G-2 and Ass't., it was customary for one to remain at the CP during the day keeping in touch with the entire situation. In addition, this officer prepared the periodic report at the conclusion of the day's activity and was prepared to give estimates of the situation during the day. The other officer paid daily visits to the regimental and battalion CP's and to the front line units. As a result of this plan, the G-2 was always personally informed of the situation on the front of the Division. This contact with the S-2's of regiments and battalions is considered invaluable for obtaining personal view points and additional information.

3. INTERPRETERS - USE AND DISTRIBUTION.

a. Distribution of the Division Language Team has been outlined in the planning phase of the operation. Each regiment used its language personnel differently. In one, both interpreters were assigned to the assault battalions and worked with the battalion S-2's. In another, both were kept at the regimental CP, and in the third, one was at the Regimental CP and one assigned to the battalion where it was felt he was most needed.

b. The practice at Division Headquarters at first was to keep two interpreters at the civilian internment camp which the Division was required to operate. This had not been anticipated and initially, only one man was assigned but this proved insufficient. This left available to the G-2, a language officer and two interpreters. Two of this trio were generally employed at the Division POW Collecting Point. The third man was available to work on call with the Reconnaissance Troop in searching enemy dead or with members of the G-2 section who, in some cases, were used for the same purpose. He was also used to sort out and translate captured documents.

c. The vast number of documents which were received presented a special problem. It would take many interpreters to translate all these and at least one man working full time to sort out and translate the most important. In view of the impossibility of complete translation, documents were given a hasty check and only those of the utmost importance (primarily captured field orders and entries in diaries and captured supply books) were translated. The remainder were sent to NTLF. Regiments and battalions found it almost impossible to make any written translations and merely checked documents for information of immediate value.

4. PRISONERS OF WAR--HANDLING, COLLECTION, AND INTERROGATION

a. Although it is appreciated that the evacuation of POWs is a G-1 function, during this operation, it was handled entirely by G-2 with some assistance from G-4. The method employed, which is outlined below, worked very satisfactorily.

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b. When plans were made for a forward displacement of the Division Command Post, a tentative location for the Division POW Collecting Point was selected by map study on the main supply road and near the proposed Division CP. The Language officer of the Division, together with a non-commissioned officer from the MP detachment detailed to guard the POW Collecting Point, went forward with the advance echelon of the command post and made a personal reconnaissance.

c. Prisoners were evacuated from the forward elements to Regimental Collecting Points and thence to the Division Collecting Point by any transportation returning to the rear. Military prisoners presented no difficulty as they were never received in any large quantities. Civilian prisoners at times presented problems which were solved by G-2 obtaining trucks from G-4 and in some cases, evacuating them directly from the regiments.

d. Evacuation from the Division Collecting Point to the Division Stockade and later to the Northern Landing Force Stockade was accomplished by taking advantage of transportation going to the rear. Again, there was little difficulty in evacuation of military prisoners and the civilian problem was solved in the same manner as above. Military Police utilized returning nontactical vehicles whenever possible and only two instances were reported of interference with tactical vehicles.

e. Once during the operation the number of civilians reached such proportions as to necessitate the retention at the division enclosure of any large number over night. In this instance, there were approximately 150 civilians interned and transportation was not available until the next morning.

f. Interrogation of prisoners was made by the language team attached to the Division. All of the Nisei had been through at least one campaign and had been attached to the Division for approximately ten months. They were well trained and had the advantage of knowing the personnel of the Division and knowing what information was particularly desired from prisoners. Before landing, they had been briefed on board ship in the enemy order of battle and given specific instruction as to the type of information which was desired. In addition, they had been instructed in the plans of operation and were familiar with the proposed employment of the troops. Therefore, language personnel were able to conduct interrogations without outside guidance. It is felt that it is essential that interrogators be familiar with the operations of our own troops and that every effort be made to see that this is done.

g. During the operation, NTLF issued interrogation forms for the interrogation of prisoners. This method had the disadvantage of producing a limiting effect on the interrogation. (Copy of the form attached as Annex B). For many cases, the form was incomplete and did not cover the information necessary for a front line division. In addition, it is very difficult to get interrogators to go beyond a form and ask additional questions.

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As a result, a plan was adopted whereby the POW was held at the Division Collecting Point until the results of the interrogation were made known to one of the officers of the G-2 section. Then, if additional information was desired, it could be obtained immediately. For this purpose, the Signal Officer ran a telephone line to the collecting point and the evacuation of prisoners was delayed only slightly. This resulted in much more effective interrogation for two reasons: first, particular questions could be asked of the prisoner; and secondly, the interpreter could be kept abreast of additional information desired and would ask other prisoners these questions without further instructions.

h. Attention is called to the fact that personnel of the Division who had been trained in the Division Language School proved of great value during this operation. Instances are reported of immediate front line interrogation which permitted our forces to locate enemy positions directly on their front and destroy them. There is no question of the value of such men and as much instruction as possible should be given them.

5. IDENTIFICATION OF JAPANESE UNITS

a. In the initial stages of the operation, it was very difficult to obtain definite identifications of Japanese units. Among the reasons for this are:

- (1) Most Japanese soldiers know only the code number of their unit, or the name of their immediate commanding officer.
- (2) Unfamiliarity of U.S. forces with the complex organization of Japanese forces.
- (3) Japs were removing and burying their dead.

b. Approximately ten days after the initial landings, NTLF published a Japanese Order of Battle of SAIPAN which listed some code numbers and commanders names. This proved invaluable and copies of this were placed in the hands of every interrogation team.

c. Identifications were obtained from the following sources:

- (1) POWs who, in many cases, know only the code number of their organization. With the assistance of the Order of Battle and additions thereto prepared by the Division G-2 section, the code numbers of the larger organizations were soon broken down.
- (2) Documents: Captured documents were of course a valuable source. Diaries, maps, orders, notebooks, etc., were taken and usually definitely located the unit on our front and in some cases, gave additional code numbers and information of other units.
- (3) "Dog tags": It is interesting to note that very few "dog tags"

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were found on Japanese soldiers or sailors. In some cases, these "dog tags" caused confusion because they contained the code number of former unit of the Japanese soldier. Many of the troops had only recently arrived from MANCHURIA and still wore the "dog tag" of their MANCHURIAN units. (Note: Japanese army "dog tags" supposedly bear the code number of the organization to which the soldier presently belongs but necessary changes are often delayed.

6. SEARCHING ENEMY DEAD.

a. Definite measures were taken by G-2 and S-2's to search enemy dead. G-2 instructed the Reconnaissance Troop to send out small groups to search the dead immediately behind front line units and S-2's used personnel of I & R platoons for the same purpose. It is appreciated that this is not a usual mission for a reconnaissance troop but with knowledge that mechanized reconnaissance would not be possible, training in this work had been undertaken and trained personnel were available.

Comment: Although it may seem strange, training and experience are necessary if men are to know how, where, and what to search for on a dead body.

b. In several instances, an interpreter was sent with a group searching the enemy dead. This method is of positive value when an interpreter can be spared, because identifications can be obtained immediately and sent back by the fastest means of communication.

Comment: If utmost value is to be obtained from search of enemy dead, bodies must be searched as soon as possible for, in addition to obvious reasons, decomposition sets in so quickly that search becomes difficult and odious.

c. A CIC detachment specially trained for this purpose would prove invaluable to a division during combat in the Pacific. Personnel of such a unit should have some knowledge of Japanese and be trained in the recognition of important documents and intelligence material.

7. OBSERVATION POSTS.

a. During the early stages of the operation, the Division did not maintain an OP because no ground was available which commanded a sufficient part of the Division front. Regimental and battalion OPs were operated and furnished sufficient information. Immediately after MT. TAPOTCHAU was captured a Division OP was set up on its summit. This was manned by four men from the Reconnaissance Troop with a noncommissioned officer in charge. They were furnished with a radio which offered direct communication to the Division CP. As the Division advanced north of MT. TAPOTCHAU, other high ground became available which permitted observation of the enemy front. As this ground was captured, the OP was moved forward and the observers were rotated by the Reconnaissance Troop.

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b. An unusually large amount of information was received in the shortest possible time from the OPs. Instances can be cited of Japanese ammunition dumps being fired upon within a few minutes after being observed by the OP, of groups of enemy troops located and subjected to artillery and mortar fire within a similar period of time, as well as enemy troop movements in rear areas. However, it should be pointed out that a large part of the terrain of SAIPAN was peculiarly well suited for a Division OP. Certain dominant terrain features gave excellent observation of most of the island area. This will probably not be as true in other operations, and it is unlikely that a division OP which permits observation of the major portion of a division front can be set up.

8. GUARDING IMPORTANT CAPTURED INSTALLATIONS.

a. A small group of men from the Reconnaissance Troop were attached to the G-2 section to operate the radios in the intelligence net and for the additional purpose of taking over and guarding important installations as soon as they were captured. This plan worked particularly well in the capture of ASLITO Airfield. All S-2s had been advised that these men were available, and in this instance, the S-2 of the 165th Infantry reported the capture of a number of buildings containing valuable intelligence material and Japanese equipment. Some of this group were immediately dispatched to the airfield and took over the protection and guarding of these installations. As a result, there was no known looting of this material and in addition, front line troops were spared the necessity of detaching men for this purpose. Much valuable material was undoubtedly saved in this instance and in other instances during the operation when these men were used similarly.

9. ESTIMATION OF ENEMY STRENGTH.

a. It is very difficult to make accurate estimates of enemy strength prior to a landing operation on an island such as SAIPAN and in the days which follow. There are several reasons for this among which are included:

- (1) The number and diversity of organizations necessary for the defense and administration of an island base.
- (2) The impossibility of accurately estimating the casualties which have been inflicted by the preliminary air and naval preparation.
- (3) Difficulty in estimating losses to the units occupying the island but suffered from submarine action while enroute.
- (4) The complex and diverse nature of the organization of the Japanese Army and Navy.
- (5) Lack of information by the U.S. of definite information on the organization and equipment of Jap forces.

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(6) Japanese practice of making Tables of Organization to fit special situations.

b. The above reasons and others made it difficult to give any accurate estimate during the early stage of the operation. Another factor was that the Japs apparently removed or buried their dead as long as they could do so. Initially few dead Japanese were encountered by the Division. POWs were very vague in giving any estimate of the casualties that their units had suffered, and as pointed out above, identifications were very difficult to obtain.

c. During the period the Division was engaged in fighting on the EAST slopes of MT. TAPOTCHAU, it became possible to prepare an order of battle with an estimate of the enemy strength on the Division front. This was issued with a periodic report. POW interrogations and translation of documents at later dates prove that this estimate was quite accurate. From this point on, it was possible to make continued and sound estimates of the enemy strength on the front of the Division. Strength in front of particular units of the Division was very difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy.

10. ENEMY FRONT LINES.

a. A perusal of periodic reports and overlays which accompany them reveal that the enemy front lines were rarely definitely defined. This is because in only a few instances during the operation did it appear that the Division was up against a definite front line or main defensive position of the Japanese. The enemy chose to defend certain key terrain features and strong points, usually hills and cliffs which were studded with caves. As a result, the lines were very fluid, many gaps appear on the periodic report overlays and in some cases, enemy lines are found in the rear of our most advance elements. Often strong points were by-passed and left for mopping-up by designated units.

b. A second reason is that our forces were continually attacking during the entire active phase of the operation. As a result of this and the disruption of his communications and the impossibility of moving reserves, the enemy was continually forced back and apparently found it difficult to set up any main line of resistance.

11. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION.

a. Within the Division.

(1) The question of dissemination of enemy information is one which no matter how stressed, will never be considered completely satisfactory. Within the Division, dissemination, both up and down the channel, was poor during the early stages of the operation. It is believed that this can be

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attributed to the fact that units were very scattered due to attachment to other organizations, and to inexperience. As the operation progressed, improvement was noticeable.

- (2) Limited production facilities made distribution of G-2 Periodic Reports impossible below regiments. This distribution was increased when the hectograph equipment became available. Report was required by higher headquarters as of 1600 each day which meant that copies did not get to message center until at least one hour after this time. Blackout driving, terrain conditions, and distance of routes due to road nets, caused further delay. In order to counteract these delays, every effort was made to give a verbal synopsis of the report to NTLF, regiments, and D/A by telephone. Even so, the dissemination cannot be considered satisfactory. Flash reports (i.e. tank activity, etc.) were required and dissemination of these was entirely satisfactory. Periodic verbal reports were required and as these came in, enemy situation on the right and/or left of the reporting unit was given.

b. Higher headquarters.

- (1) Little information of combat value was received from NTLF during the operation. Requests were made that our headquarters be furnished with periodic reports during the day of enemy activity on the fronts of the other divisions. This request, however, was very rarely honored and very little information was received. Only once or twice did any member of the G-2 section of higher headquarters, other than language officers, pay a personal visit to the Division CP. Requests were also made for estimates of the strength of the enemy remaining on the island in order that the Division might prepare an estimate on its immediate front, but only vague answers were given, and then, after delay.
- (2) The reason given for failure to disseminate the information on the fronts of adjacent divisions is one that might bear further study. It was stated that liaison officers of divisions were for that purpose. It is true that some intelligence information was received from these officers., but they are accustomed to work under the G-3 section and in practice most of their information is of more value to G-3 than to G-2. Communications also handicapped this source.
- (3) The most valuable information provided the Division was the Order of Battle prepared by NTLF Language Section. Its value has been pointed out above.

12. PERIODIC REPORTS.

In accordance with the intelligence Annex of NTLF, G-2 periodic
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reports were submitted as of 1600 each day. The necessity for setting a definite time for the submission of these is recognized. However, the results of doing so should be noted. On many occasions, our attack was still progressing at this time of the day and therefore, the report did not present a true picture of activities at the day's close and in addition, the capabilities changed as the troops advanced. Secondly, the difficulty of reproducing and distributing reports meant that in many cases the reports were not received by lower echelons until daybreak of the following day.

Comment: It is highly desirable that periodic reports be submitted as of a certain phase in the day's operations. So far as possible, this time should be selected so as to include the conclusion of the day's attack and at a time that front line units are usually establishing their perimeters for the night.

13. AIRPLANE OBSERVATION AND PHOTO MISSIONS.

a. There were comparatively few times during the operation when the Division requested observation missions flown. There are several reasons for this, among which are:

- (1) Initially planes were not available for this purpose.
- (2) Battalions and regiments had available to them JASCO Units which were in direct communications with observation planes and information could be requested directly. Most of the Division requests related to activity in enemy areas, particularly movement of reserves and location of enemy artillery. The majority of air mission reports were negative because of the concealment afforded the enemy by the SAIPAN terrain.

b. Aerial photos proved of little value during the operation. They were requested on numerous occasions but either were received too late or were not clear enough to be of value. In addition, it took at least 36 hours to get the photographs from NTLF and when they were received they had not been catalogued. Because of this, it was extremely difficult to locate the areas covered by the photos. Several times photos were received which were supposed to be of a certain area and turned out to be of an entirely different place. Some effort should be made by higher headquarters, where facilities are available, to sort pictures to insure that only those usable are distributed to the troops and that they are accurately located on the map. So few copies were received that front line battalions and companies which are primarily interested in them, did not receive copies.

14. USE OF RECONNAISSANCE TROOP

a. In planning for this operation, the Commanding General issued instructions that the troop would be employed in missions which would be selected generally by G-2 or after coordination with him. It is felt that this method should be followed habitually. Lack of shipping space prevented the loading of any armored cars of the troop and in addition, it was felt

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their use would be extremely limited by terrain. Therefore, the only mechanized equipment brought by the troop was four half-tracks in addition to five 1/4 tons.

b. Missions given the Reconnaissance Troop consisted of the following:

- (1) Operating Division OP as outlined above.
- (2) Searching of and estimation of number of enemy dead.
- (3) The troop was used for a period of several days in maintaining contact with the adjacent divisions; this became necessary when gaps occurred between divisions and when the extremely rugged nature of the terrain prohibited personal contact between them.
- (4) Night patrolling activities were conducted by the troop on the Division front for several nights.
- (5) The half-tracks were used for supply and for the evacuation of wounded in several instances when this was the only type of vehicle which could reach the front. It is obvious that this is not a reconnaissance mission but these were the only half tracks available within the Division and their use was essential at the time.
- (6) Patrolling and protecting the south shore of SAIPAN during the Divisions advance across the southern part of SAIPAN.

15. REPORTS FROM FRONT LINE UNITS.

a. In spite of the stress given in training to making accurate reports, (how, when, what, where, etc.) there were many cases of reports from companies and battalions which were general in nature such as, "Received heavy enemy fire from our left flank," "Strong opposition on our front," etc. One cause for this may be that Bn S-2's were lost by becoming casualties and also were used to replace other officer casualties. Of the nine battalions in the Division, only two of the original S-2's were functioning in that sole capacity at the conclusion of the operation. This meant that staff sergeants were required to assume the S-2 duties. All did extremely well.

16. ENEMY CHEMICAL WARFARE EQUIPMENT.

a. There were no instances verified of the Japanese using gas during this operation nor was any gas laying equipment or shells found. However, almost all Japs carried gas masks and a considerable amount of protective clothing, of excellent manufacture, was taken.

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17. LOCATION OF ENEMY ARTILLERY POSITIONS

a. During the operation, it was extremely difficult to locate enemy artillery when it opened fire on our troops. In some instances, it may have been that mortar fire was reported as artillery but this could not have been universally true. On one occasion, when the Division CP was receiving artillery fire, communication by telephone was established with the Div Arty S-2 who was in direct contact by radio with three observation planes in the air. Despite the fact that those planes were observing over the area from which the enemy artillery was believed to be firing, they were unable to locate the pieces. One cause for this is that the enemy artillery in many cases was concealed in caves and dug-outs. It is felt that a Corps Arty Sound and Flash Range Bn might have been of value. Of interest, however, is a statement of POWs who say that when their artillery opened up, a concentration of our fires was placed upon them and their gunners frequently deserted their guns.

18. DETECTION AND LOCATION OF MINE FIELDS.

a. The Japanese showed little skill or originality in laying mine fields on SAIPAN. However, large quantities of mines of various types, many of which were of excellent construction, were captured. Some mine fields were encountered and in addition, artillery shells and airplane bombs were emplaced as mines. One of our tanks was severely damaged and three of the crew killed when it ran over a bomb buried as a mine. Beaches were mined with the customary Japanese anti boat mine and a large number of sea mines were captured. Most of the mines were not discovered until a tank or vehicle had run over one.

Comment: Additional training of engineer personnel in the detection, removal of, and marking of lanes through mine fields, is necessary as it is probable that mine fields in larger numbers will be encountered in future operations against the Japs.

19. TANKS.

a. Best estimates place the number of Japanese tanks on SAIPAN at 101, the majority of which were medium tanks. Included among these were a number of amphibious tanks. Although the principal Japanese tank unit (9th tank Regt (-)) contained a number of veterans of tank fighting in MANCHURIA, they showed no improvement in tank tactics. Tanks employed against the Division were used piecemeal, in night attacks and from camouflaged positions from which they emerged and commenced firing just before our troops came upon them; or fired from the rear if our troops passed them by. The 27th Division claims credit for knocking out 41-47 enemy tanks.

20. PATROL ACTIVITY.

a. After a certain period, orders from higher headquarters directed that patrols be sent out each night. For several nights, the Reconnaissance Troop was used for this purpose. Patrols of the troop varied in size

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from eight men to a platoon.

b. During the later phases of the operation, infantry battalions conducted limited night patrolling to their immediate front and flanks. The majority of the resulting reports were negative and in very few instances were there any reports of enemy activity. It is believed the troops need more training in this subject. Daylight patrolling was limited because of the fact that the Division was constantly advancing thereby affording little opportunity to send out patrols to probe and feel out enemy positions. In addition, preparatory artillery fires were being laid down and bombing and strafing missions being executed by the air force. That patrol activity must be carefully coordinated with the artillery and air, is obvious. One instance is reported of a large body (200) of enemy troops being observed in the open but artillery fire could not be placed upon them because friendly patrols from a Marine Division were operating too close to the area.

21. FLASH REPORTS.

a. Activity of enemy aviation was practically nil except at night and then caused little damage. Reports of enemy planes approaching at night came from higher headquarters where radar was available. In some cases, delay was encountered in the transmission of these reports.

b. With regard to tanks, reports of enemy action were received almost as soon as the tanks were observed. The flash report system worked very well in warning of tank action and there are no instances of tanks breaking through barbed wire lines.

22. JAPANESE TACTICS -- COMMENTS.

a. Once again the Jap ended his defense in a large scale "counter attack" (Japanese "Gyoku-Sai" -- "Die in honor") with the apparent objective of killing as many of our troops as possible before he himself was wiped out.

b. In the period following the end of organized resistance by the enemy, a questionnaire was distributed to certain Division General and Special Staff officers and all Regimental and Battalion Commanders, S-2s and S-3's requesting comments on enemy tactics which they had observed. The following is a list of these observations. Those marked (*) were mentioned by several officers.

(1) *Use by the enemy of caves, rock covered terrain, and tree covered areas as strong points.

(2) *Use by the enemy of smokeless powder with the practice of firing only 3-4 shots at a time thereby making it difficult to locate his position.

(3) *Enemy lack of appreciation of defensive organization.

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- (4) *Several occasions were reported of the enemy firing his artillery and/or mortars on our troops at the same time that our artillery was in action in the same general area in an apparent attempt to give our troops the impression that our artillery was falling short.
- (5) *Practice of night infiltration, often in groups of considerable size.
- (6) *Use of land mines was crude and hasty.
- (7) *Use of reverse slopes for defense on several occasions.
- (8) Enemy appeared to use our long bursts of MG fire as a means of locating targets. This was confirmed in POW interrogations who stated that long bursts revealed the location of automatic weapons.
- (9) Lack of organization in retrograde movements and along lines of resistance. MGs reported placed without plans for traversing fire.
- (10) Practice of enemy to collect and make use of our equipment which had been dropped by our casualties.
- (11) Many enemy artillery pieces knocked out by our fire were found located at road junctions or curves and laid for direct fire to cover long stretches of road. Enemy did not (probably could not) use his artillery for mass fire and confined his fire to one or two pieces at a time, firing comparatively few rounds.
- (12) Near the conclusion of the operation, the enemy frequently used his tanks in concealed locations and they did not open fire until our troops were almost on them. This action was frequently reported as "immobile tanks being used as pill-boxes".
- (13) Enemy counter attacks were poorly timed and lacked coordination, but invariably were pushed to the limit.
- (14) While not tactics, the individual enemy soldier's spirit of "Die for the Emperor" is confusing by its frequent non-tactical element of surprise.

23. ENEMY SUPPLY ESTABLISHMENTS.

A. During the operation, large numbers of enemy supply dumps of all classes as well as much valuable equipment were captured. Food caches

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and ammunition dumps were scattered over the island in groves, caves and valleys. Enough food alone was taken on SAIPAN to feed the interned civilian population for a period estimated as 7 months.

b. Although G-2's problem ends with the capture of these and after he has obtained any information therefrom, several points that arose should be noted. In the first place, enemy ammunition dumps were frequently captured near the close of the day and therefore, could not be moved or thoroughly examined. Such precautions are necessary as booby traps and electric wires permitting detonation by the Japanese were found in some cases. One ammunition dump blew up early in the evening, apparently set off by remote control or by infiltrating parties, and caused casualties to our own troops who were in the immediate vicinity. Secondly, the enemy, knowing the location of his dumps, in many cases directed artillery and mortar fire on them in an apparent effort to detonate them.

24. ENEMY KNOWLEDGE OF OUR SITUATION.

a. Early in the operation, superior observation undoubtedly gave the enemy complete knowledge of our situation. MT. TAPOTCHAU and the hills south of it completely dominate the southern section of SAIPAN. As we advanced north and seized MT. TAPOTCHAU, enemy observation became poorer and undoubtedly from that point on, he had limited information of our activities.

6. POWs report that our landings were a complete surprise. Even when our ships appeared off shore, there is evidence that the enemy was not certain we were going to land. It is not known that the enemy captured any soldiers of this Division or received any information from this source. Several instances were reported where Division units lost classified documents, but there are no known cases of the enemy taking advantage of, or actually obtaining these documents. During the final counter-attack of 7 July, the enemy overran positions containing SOIs and orders, but it is believed that he was so completely disorganized at that time, that these were not used or even recognized by him.

25. PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS AND PUBLIC ADDRESS BROADCASTS.

a. Higher headquarters had prepared leaflets calling upon the Japs to surrender, which were dropped from planes both before landings were made and during the operation. The value of these and their proper phraseology will be discussed under recommendations. Several times during the operation, the Division requested that leaflets be dropped. In the majority of these cases, the leaflets fell either on our own troops or in the ocean and proved of little value.

b. The public address systems which were set up in the tanks of tank commanders, proved of little value for the reason that every time these were desired, the tanks were actively engaged in combat. It should be noted however, that the Division had attached to it only a Provisional Tank Bn and

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that if a full battalion had been attached, tanks from the headquarters unit might have been more available. In the few instances that tanks were used for broadcasting purposes, some success was achieved.

c. Due to the very limited use of tank loud speakers, it was necessary to obtain public address systems from any source available. Initially JASCO units furnished these from their shore parties. When its equipment was landed, Division Signal Co. provided one. However, these systems were too bulky to be transported into the jungle or cave areas, and could only be operated from places where a vehicle could go. During the active operation, the prisoners obtained from the use of the system were few in number, but during the mop-up phase, the PA system proved of great value.

26. ENEMY CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS OF WAR.

a. During period 16 June thru 16 July 1944, the 27th Infantry Division records give the following tallies of enemy killed, enemy service personnel taken prisoner, and civilians taken into custody by troops of the Division:

*Killed	10537
**POW.	62
**Civilians in Custody .	1129

*Includes enemy killed by elements of the 27th Division while attached to the 2nd or 4th Marine Divisions.

**Does not include POWs or civilians taken into custody by elements of the 27th Division while attached to 2nd or 4th Marine Divisions.

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TINIAN AND MOP - UP PHASE - 10 July - 7 Aug, 19441. TINIAN.

a. From 10 July to 30 July, the Division less one regiment was held in alert for use on TINIAN. During this period, all intelligence activities were directed toward preparation for this possible mission. This included:

- (1) Two meetings attended by Division General and Special Staff officers and Regimental and Battalion commanders and staffs during which orientation on terrain and enemy strength on TINIAN was given by AC of S, G-2.
- (2) Translation and distribution of copies of a captured Jap map showing terrain descriptions. (Maps were obtained from G-2, AGF).
- (3) Preparation of the proposed intelligence annex to accompany the Division field order if and when required.
- (4) Preparation and distribution of an Order of Battle for TINIAN showing distribution of enemy units as disclosed by a map captured on SAIPAN.
- (5) Meeting with all intelligence officers for discussion of intelligence system as a result of SAIPAN experiences with resulting changes and additions.
- (6) Preparation of an increased questionnaire form for use in interrogation of POW's.
- (7) Visit by AC of S, G-2, to Hdqrs NTLF, and 2nd and 4th MarDivs on TINIAN for reconnaissance of terrain and combat information.

b. On 30 July, the division was released from the TINIAN alert and assigned the mop-up mission of the northeastern portion of SAIPAN. Intelligence activities of this period included:

- (1) Tabulation of daily figures of enemy killed or captured and civilians killed or taken into custody.
- (2) Preliminary interrogation of POW's and civilians taken into custody to ascertain location of other groups.
- (3) Frequent use of broadcasts to groups of enemy found in caves or surrounded in gulches.

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c. As matter of record and interest, the following figures are included in this report for the mop-up period and the period following thereafter. Figures attributable to elements of the 27th Infantry Division only are included. It should be born in mind that these figures are compiled from combat results after the announcement that SAIPAN had been "secured".

<u>Date</u>	<u>KILLED</u>		<u>POW</u>	
	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
July 16-30 incl (105 INF)	773	38	117	674
July 31 - Aug 7 (incl)	796	107	75	452
Aug 8 - 31 (incl)	331	9	66	342
	<u>1900</u>	<u>174</u>	<u>258</u>	<u>1468</u>

Comment: The above figures should serve as warning to all intelligence officers that the fight is not over at the moment the word "secured" is given. They must be alert to the fact that in following days there will be plenty of grief from enemy groups hiding in caves, gulches, and rough terrain and their ingenuity will be taxed to suggest methods of assisting the troops to root out such groups. It is during this period that interpreters and broadcasts are in particular demand.

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SECTION V

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The following recommendations are submitted as a result of experience gained in preparation for and during the SAIPAN operation.

1. MAPS: It is recommended that:

a. Scale 1/20,000 be continued as the official scale.

b. Target square system be continued but a more prominent color be used for the numbers designating the squares. Consideration must be given to choice of a color which will not make terrain features unreadable. Training to include a further mental division of 200 yard sub-squares as explained in Section I par 4.

c. Distribution be made to include squad leaders. Maps of scale 1/62,500 be provided for orientation purposes to include platoon leaders.

d. Maps of scale 1/10,000 be provided for use of staffs.

e. Litho mosaic maps of scale 1/20,000 be provided to include platoon leaders, but printed on more legible paper and from the most recent photographs possible, even if distribution must be delayed until a few days prior to embarkation.

2. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS:

a. Under the present T/O of an Infantry Division which limits facilities for P.I. study, vertical photographs of 24" focal length taken at 10,000 feet and oblique photographs taken at 1000 to 1500 feet are recommended.

b. During planning phase, a minimum of five (5) sets of each is recommended for an Infantry Division.

c. During operation phase distribution of complete sets is recommended to include Division Headquarters, each Infantry Regimental Headquarters, D/A Headquarters, and each Artillery Battalion Headquarters. It would be ideal if selected photographs could be available to each Infantry Battalion Headquarters covering the Battalion area with further selection to each Company Commander covering his immediate front.

d. Oblique coverage of the terrain 2000 to 5000 yards ahead of a division front at time intervals depending on the progress of the advance and with distribution similar to that described in c above.

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e. Vectograph photographs are considered invaluable for planning purposes before and during an operation.

f. Comment: Value of photographs during combat depends greatly on the length of the delay between time of taking and receipt by users. This is a problem to be solved by headquarters above division and requires serious consideration and planning.

3. RELIEF MODELS: It is recommended that:

a. Production of a minimum of five (5) relief models for planning purposes be made available as quickly as possible after assignment of a mission.

b. Production of enough relief models be accomplished in order that one model will be available for study and orientation on each ship carrying combat personnel. Models are not considered essential on AKAs.

c. Production of models of definitely chosen landing beaches to include terrain as far as the initial beachhead line be made.

4. PLANNING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

a. As previously described, many headquarters are involved in planning an operation. Working independently Intelligence Sections of these Headquarters are frequently working on the same angle and in turn will produce this angle as intelligence information. This was particularly true in preparation of Photo Interpretation Reports for the Forager Operation. The result of this particular case was a deluge of material (sometimes contradictory) on the lowest element, in this case the division.

b. It is recommended that higher Headquarters prescribe weekly or more frequent conferences be held between Intelligence Officers of all headquarters involved in order that each may be familiar with the other's plans and duplication of effort prevented. A centralized group of P. I. specialists would materially simplify this angle. Such coordination cannot but reduce time, labor, expense, and headaches.

5. PROPAGANDA:

a. It is recommended that all propaganda prepared for distribution prior to or during an operation be reviewed by persons of Japanese ancestry who are thoroughly familiar with Japanese psychology. This also applies to preparation of broadcasts urging the enemy to surrender. A check must be included on the printing of Japanese characters as mistakes amuse the Japanese soldier and greatly reduce the value of propaganda leaflets. A study of POW interrogation reports will frequently suggest propaganda angles which prisoners have volunteered as suggestions along this line.

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PHOTO INTERPRETATION SECTION

One (1) officer
2 Interpreters

Comment: The value of aerial photographs, if received in reasonable time, is extremely high. Their value is lessened unless trained photo interpreters are available to study the pictures and disseminate the results rapidly to those who need them. It is further recommended that one (1) trained photo interpreter be included in the T/O of each infantry regiment and a minimum of one (1) in the T/O of a division artillery headquarters.

PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION

One (1) officer
6 enlisted men

Comment: The personnel should be trained in all phases of Public Relation activities. It is recommended that personnel be distributed: One (1) officer assigned to division headquarters for general supervision. Two (2) men to be assigned with this officer. This group should cover all units of a division except the division artillery and the three (3) infantry regiments, to each of which one (1) man should be assigned. During a combat operation, transportation is required by the PR Section for use of correspondents.

LANGUAGE SECTION

(See separate recommendations)

CENSORSHIP DETACHMENTS

a. It is recommended that the AC of S, G-2 of a division, and the senior officer representing a Theater Censor, be authorized to make censorship decisions as problems arise during combat operations and the period immediately following.

b. It is further recommended that the censorship team attached to a division from the Office of a Theater Censor, be of sufficient strength to censor all of a division's mail. If this is the case, such a team will be familiar with all restrictions imposed on a division prior to and during an operation and will aid in reducing the delay in out-going mail which occurred during the SAIPAN Operation.

Comment: For some months, two (2) officers and one (1) enlisted man were attached to the Division from the Office of the Theater Censor, CPA. This personnel accompanied the Division to SAIPAN. They were instructed by Theater Censor, CPA, prior to departure from OAHU, but not given authority to make censorship decisions on the ground as problems arose. Similar authority was not given to the Division. This resulted in some confusion and lack of understanding.

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8. PERMANENT LANGUAGE TEAMS.

a. It is recommended that Nisei language teams become permanent parts of Infantry divisions operating in the Pacific Theater. If this is not possible, it is recommended that nucleus of a team be a permanent part of a division. The necessity for such action is considered paramount for the following reasons:

- (1) Familiarization of personnel of a division with the Nisei personnel who will work with them is essential.
- (2) Familiarization of Nisei personnel with a division's plan of use of them. The extreme contrast between the operations of the 27th Division Language team in the Gilberts (6 weeks after it joined the Division) and at SAIPAN is an example.
- (3) Need of Nisei personnel in rehabilitation periods for instruction of division personnel in Japanese phrases, common documents, and interrogation procedure; instruction of selected personnel in the Japanese language; processing of trophies; and translation.

b. It is recommended that a language team be increased to consist of four (4) officers and sixteen (16) enlisted men to be used in an operation as follows:

One (1) officer and two (2) men at division headquarters - interrogation and translation.

One (1) officer and two (2) men for use of the civil affairs officer and on release, to augment the division headquarters team.

One (1) officer and four (4) men with each infantry regiment. (Two at regimental headquarters and one with each battalion)

NOTE: Division Artillery with its many radios reported many Japanese intercepts during the SAIPAN Operation and it is possible that material of value could have been picked up from these had a man who understood Japanese been available at the moment.

9. ORDER OF BATTLE.

a. It is recommended that until such time as tables of organization of an infantry division authorize Order of Battle personnel, one man be designated in a division intelligence section to act in that capacity as his principle duty. This man should receive all possible data covering the subject. He must become thoroughly familiar with Japanese army terms and its constantly varying organization. In the field, his time should be reserved for the performance of his special duties. Selection of the man to fill this job will

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require serious consideration as the duty requires an analytical mind.

10. RADIO SETS FOR OP PERSONNEL.

a. It is recommended that an infantry division G-2 section be equipped with two (2) SCR 300 sets for communication to and from division advance OPs.

11. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING FOR UNITS.

During the training period prior to the SAIPAN operation, emphasis was placed on the obtaining and accurate reporting of intelligence information by all personnel and in particular by officers, noncommissioned officers, and patrols. There were frequent cases when negative results of this training occurred. It is recommended that added emphasis be given to night and day patrolling and submission of accurate, brief, and correct reports. Sketching should also be included. It is suggested that in all battalion and company tactical problems, this subject be emphasized to the point that the commander's solution be considered unsatisfactory if the intelligence angle is not satisfactorily met.

12. PROCESSING OF POWs AND CIVILIANS.

a. It is recommended that future training exercises include actual G-1, G-2, G-4 situations involving processing of POWs and civilians in order that procedure can be coordinated. POWs and civilians should be represented and not simulated, thrown into the problem in varying numbers and at various times, and routes of evacuation should be realistic so that all possible situations are presented. Transportation facilities should be limited. ME training should include searching of enemy personnel, utilization of proper vehicles, and instruction in similar subjects met in an operation.

13. TRAINING OF RECONNAISSANCE TROOP:

a. It is recognized that the primary mission of a division reconnaissance troop is distant mechanized reconnaissance to the front and flanks of a division. Operations in the Central Pacific against atolls and relatively small islands with rugged mountainous terrain have severely limited this use. In addition, shipping space has not been available for the mechanized equipment of a troop. As a result, troops have been trained and used either as combat units similar to rifle companies or as amphibious reconnaissance units. In the SAIPAN Operation, the 27th Division Reconnaissance Troop was assigned a number of varied missions. The majority of these were of value for intelligence purposes but were not primarily reconnaissance.

b. It will be recognized that as a result of combat experience to date in this theatre, the primary purpose of Reconnaissance Troops has of necessity been placed in the background. It is to be anticipated that future operations in the Pacific will demand the use of the troop along the lines for which it was organized. However, undoubtedly, there will be other in-

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stances where the specialized training troops have been given will prove of value, particularly amphibious reconnaissance, rubber boat training, and dismounted patrolling. Therefore, it is recommended that the training of a troop emphasize mechanized reconnaissance but that training also continue in the specialized subjects.

14. PUBLIC RELATIONS:

- a. For recommendations see Annex - A - .

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ANNEX - (A) - REPORT OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. GENERAL.

a. Public Relations activities of the 27th Infantry Division during the SAIPAN Operation were covered by two types of correspondents:

- (1) Combat correspondents and photographers attached to the Division by Hq CPA. These correspondents were all either officers or enlisted men of the Army. Included in this group was a photographic team from the CPA Signal Photo Lab. whose mission covered intelligence studies as well as PR services.
- (2) Civilian correspondents and photographers representing newspapers, magazines, press services, and news reels. These representatives were assigned by Naval Headquarters to move on designated ships and to cover specific units.

2. PLANNING.

a. During the weeks preceding departure for the Operation, the Division PR Officer devoted most of his time to close association with the Public Relations Section, CPA. It was recognized that atoll combat, lasting only a few days, would be supplanted by land mass fighting which can last over an extended period. With this in mind it was necessary that well coordinated but flexible plans be made. Included in the planning were:

- (1) A complete knowledge of the policies of CPA headquarters.
- (2) Complete familiarity with Naval censorship regulations as Navy completely controlled this feature of press releases.
- (3) Elastic plans for accumulation, preparation, and transmission of copy and pictures.
- (4) Familiarity with tactical plans by the Division PR officer.
- (5) Cultivation of acquaintanceship with all newspaper correspondents and in particular those assigned to cover the Division.

3. ASSIGNMENT OF CORRESPONDENTS.

a. As previously noted, civilian press correspondents were assigned by Navy for movement to SAIPAN. In order to cover all phases of the operation, the Navy planned that these correspondents would prepare pooled copy. This copy received radio release to Pearl Harbor. In addition, correspondents were permitted to mail copy after censoring had been done by the Navy. This plan functioned to a degree for approximately the first week but broke down

when the command ship, which controlled the copy, was required to leave the vicinity of SAIPAN. At this time, civilian correspondents were changed from Division coverage to general coverage and thereafter acted in a free lance capacity.

b. The combat correspondent and photographic personnel supplied by CPA consisted of one (1) officer and fourteen (14) men. These men were distributed as follows:

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

Public Relations Officer, CPA
Combat Correspondent
News Photographer

EACH INFANTRY REGIMENT

Combat Correspondent
2 Still photographers
Movie Photographer

Combat correspondent group assigned to Division Headquarters covered the D/A and special units and movie men from the Infantry Teams were available for such pictures of these same organizations.

c. Photographic Team attached to the Division from the CPA Photographic Laboratory consisted of one (1) officer and five (5) men; three (3) were still and three (3) were movie cameramen. It was understood by AC of S, G-2 that their missions were to be threefold:

- (1) Photographs of subjects which the officer in charge considered of interest to the WD.
- (2) Photographing subjects for intelligence purposes as directed by AC of S, G-2, CPA.
- (3) Photo coverage of the Division for news and intelligence purposes.

Originally this team was broken into three sub-teams, each consisting of one movie and one still photographer, and each sub-team was attached to an Infantry Regiment. The officer in charge was advised of feature subjects by the division PR Officer whenever possible.

Comment: The functioning of the Photographic Team was not satisfactory. It is not believed that further comment is necessary as the reason was one of leadership. The officer in charge did not fulfill his intelligence missions, was constantly unavailable as he was on personally selected missions, and returned to OAHU before the end of the operation. One enlisted man voluntarily remained behind to film movies covering actions of the Division.

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4. PROCEDURE.

- a. Press coverage of the operation covered three (3) distinct phases:
- (1) Approximately the first two weeks when the news agencies were interested in the overall picture.
 - (2) Period thereafter when the regional stories were demanded, the operation having lost front page priority.
 - (3) The entire period, but particularly toward the close of the operation when "hero" stories were in demand.

b. In newspaper terms a story is cold after twenty-four hours. Therefore, speed and accuracy were necessary. To provide this, the following plan was made. In order to provide shelter, maintenance, and working facilities to civilian correspondents NTLF established a "Press Club" in CHARAN KANOVA at which the following daily routine was observed by the Division PR officer.

- (1) A situation map was kept.
- (2) Combat correspondents' copy was picked up daily.
- (3) Copy of the combat correspondents was passed to civilian correspondents.
- (4) Civilian correspondents were briefed by the Division PR officer on the previous day's activities and the tactical plans for the present day, which information he obtained at headquarters NTLF.
- (5) Civilian correspondents prepared their copy.
- (6) Division PR Officer delivered press copy to the command ship for censorship and transmission.
- (7) Division PR Officer informed the civilian correspondents of particular occurrences which might be desired as human interest or special features.

5. COMMENTS:

a. The civilian newspaper man is a human being. It is natural that he will turn his attention to where his own best personal interests lie. Those civilian correspondents assigned to the 27th Infantry Division were human and after several days of hitch hiking and caring for themselves, it was natural for them to incline toward coverage of units which provided them with transportation and conveniences. To combat this it is apparent that in future operations, particularly those which include other branches of the service, transportation and maintenance must be considered by the Army for represent-

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atives of the press if the Army is to get complete coverage.

b. The Combat Correspondent is a part of the service. As such he is primarily a soldier. However to cover his job completely he must be constantly on the move with little time for rest and is in contact continually with officers and men who do not know him and who handicap his work because of this lack of knowledge. A combat correspondent should be allowed to wear a distinguishing patch, personnel should be educated as to their duties, and sufficient combat correspondents should be provided so that shifts can be arranged.

6. ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. During the SAIPAN Operation 10,000 feet of black and white and 2,500 feet of Kodachrome movie film were taken of Division activities. Approximately 1500 still pictures were shot. Over 700 stories were written and released to the press or to the Public Relations Section, G-2 CPA.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS.

(NOTE: The word "Correspondent" is used to cover both newsman and photographers)

a. It is recommended that study be made and equipment provided to meet the needs of civilian press representatives attached to an Army Division to cover an operation. This should include transportation, maintenance, and working facilities.

b. It is recommended that the number of combat (enlisted) correspondents working with a division during an operation be increased to twenty (20) so that these men can be relieved at intervals to prepare their copy and accomplish the "reporting" end of their duties. Combat correspondents should wear an identifying patch and be afforded means of transportation. (30 combat correspondents and 70 combat photographers were present with Marine units during the SAIPAN Operation)

c. It is recommended that all Army personnel be thoroughly familiarized with the functions and duties of civilian and combat correspondents in order that they may have a clear conception of how this personnel should be received and assisted.

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ANNEX B

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NTLF POW INTERROGATION FORM

Date: _____

Name:

When did POW come to area:

UNIT - complete identification: name, number, organization -

Time and place of capture:

Circumstances of capture/surrender:

Food:

Water:

Propaganda leaflets:

Morale of POW - expand on this:

What is morale of his unit:

Casualties in his unit:

Disposal of enemy dead:

Where has unit gone:

What units oppose us:

Size:

Disposition:

Weapons:

Enemy communication and organization - telephones, radio centers:

(Note to Language Officers: Press these questions - GET THE INFO SOMEHOW-
GET AROUND THEM - GET THE DOPE THAT IS URGENTLY NEEDED NOW! If POW doesn't
know, say so, but get everything he does know!

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ANNEX C

PROPOSED 27TH INFANTRY DIVISION INTERROGATION FORM

The following points of enemy information will be covered by those interpreters assigned to the Division POW Collection Point.

1. Name, age, rank, serial number, branch.
2. POW's date of arrival at _____.
3. Date of departure from JAPAN or previous station.
4. Organization - including code number and COs of Co., En, and Regt.
5. Initial strength of organization and detailed history of its action since time of our landing/attack.

6. Casualties of his unit - other units.
7. Strength of forces on _____.
8. Identification of any other units opposing us, or in area - code numbers, strength, disposition, weapons. Check this against the Order of Battle.

9. Location of artillery or dual purpose guns - mortars, MGs.
10. Location and strength of reserves (i.e., any force or assembly of troops, no matter how small, in rear areas.)

11. Location of headquarters of his unit, other headquarters.
12. Location, number, and size of any tanks - both mobile and immobile.
13. Location and size of any mine fields - including bombs and shells buried as mines - STRESS.
14. Location and type of enemy dumps - food, water, ammunition.
15. Any information as to the enemy's plan of defense (i.e. delaying action, fixed line, counter-attack, etc.)
16. Location and type of any prepared defensive positions.
17. Does POW know of any plans for a counter-attack, including assembly area, strength, time, plan, etc? Stress this as enemy situation becomes increasingly difficult.
18. Disposition of enemy dead.
19. Are they searching our dead, and if so, are they receiving any information?
20. POW's morale.
21. Morale of enemy troops on _____.
22. Food and water conditions.
23. What are enemy communications?
24. What is our most effective weapon?
25. What was the effect of preliminary bombing and shelling?
26. Location of any civilian assembly areas.
27. Location of any difficult and critical terrain features.
28. How much did the enemy know of the operation on _____ - how long were communications open and how effective were they?
29. Effect of propaganda leaflets - previous days and future,

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30. Reaction to interrogation by Nisei.



2. Completion of answers to the questions on this list does not end your job. Go after any other information concerning the operation which you can obtain.

3. Written reports will be provided to G-2 as soon as possible, giving in detail the information received from the POW. If possible, the POW will be retained at the collecting point until an officer of the G-2 Section has had the opportunity to review the written report. Each report will be signed by the interrogator in charge before being submitted to G-2.

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MAP of SAIPAN

SCALE: 1:40,000

HEADQUARTERS 27TH INFANTRY DIVISION
OPERATIONS of 27TH INF DIV
17 JUNE - 9 JULY 1944

PREPARED BY A C of S, G-3

25 JUNE - 2ND BN 105 INF
(UNDER NLF CONTROL)

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 161700 June 1944
To : 171700 June 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div
TA 126Y
17 June 1944

No. 1

Maps: SAIPAN, 1/20,000, Sheet No. 5

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Omitted.

2. ENEMY OPERATION DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary -

(1) None.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Enemy casualties and POW's*

(1) No report.

b. Weather and visibility - Heavy showers during night and morning; visibility fair, except during rain.

c. Miscellaneous -

(1) None.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. No report.

Van Antwerp
VAN ANTWERP
Lt Colonel
G-2

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1600 17 June 1944
To : 1600 18 June 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div
TA 118R
18 June 1944

No. 2

Maps: SAIPAN 1/20,000, Sheet 5

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line - Overlay attached.

b. Defensive organization - During day, only organized enemy positions were those circling ASLITO AIRPORT which consisted of reinforced concrete blockhouses and underground dugouts of large dimensions. High ground extending SE from the airport also contained strong enemy positions. 4th MarDiv air observer reports enemy activity in TA 108 where trenches and AA installations appeared in process.

c. Units in contact - No identifications have been obtained by troops of this division. Captured annex to enemy field order of May giving dispositions of units forwarded to Hq NLF at 0830. Type of resistance follows an organized plan giving the impression that the enemy is not disorganized and that their morale remains unchanged.

d. Artillery - Artillery fire reported from positions in TA 108.

e. Reserve and other forces - No information.

f. Supply and evacuation establishments - No information.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary-- of last night, enemy had been driven to line approximately 300 yards W of the airport and on high ground running SE from the airport. During the night, enemy counterattacked from the latter high ground driving our right back approximately 1200 yds. Commencing at day-break, our forces recommenced the attack and by noon, had regained the high ground. At 1015, the enemy had been driven from ASLITO AIRFIELD. From these times on, enemy resistance was organized but light. During afternoon, they withdrew slowly before our advances.

b. AA artillery - Reported in TA 108.

c. Miscellaneous - Six (6) enemy mines discovered along SE coast from TA 117Q to TA 109D. Evidence that other mines had been blown or removed. May be mines on reef.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. (1) Enemy casualties estimated light. Bodies found by our troops infrequently.

(2) Prisoners - Approximately twelve (12) civilian prisoners taken by 105th Inf. One (1) wounded Japanese soldiers taken by 165th Inf.

b. Morale - Continues unchanged.

c. Supply and equipment - Large quantities of technical supplies were abandoned at the airfield as well as quantities of ammunition. Caves along the SE coast from TA 117Q to TA 109D reported to contain stocks of ammunition.

d. Terrain not under our control - See overlay.

e. Enemy knowledge of our situation - High ground to the N occupied by the enemy gives him complete observation of our activities.

f. Weather and visibility - Have remained excellent during day except for dust clouds following movement of vehicles.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy is capable of continuing his withdrawal to the E, occupying the high ground in TA 102, 108, 115, 124 from which he can launch counterattacks against us. The enemy is capable of attempting to remove his forces to the N into the high ground known to be already held by him. The enemy is capable of attempting landings along the S and SE shores from TINIAN thereby coming in our rear in order to relieve the pressure on his troops being forced back to the E.

Wm M Van Antwerp

WM. M. VAN ANTWERP
Lt Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-2

10

16

FRONT LINE 18/1600 JUNE

EST. ENEMY

ENEMY OCCUPIED AREA

08

13

G-2 SITUATION OVERLAY
TO ACCOMPANY
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT #2
AS OF 1600 - 18 JUNE 1944
SAIPAN 1:20,000

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1600 18 June 1944
To : 1600 19 June 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div
TA 118Y
19 June 1944

No. 3

Maps: SAIPAN, 1/20,000, Sheet No. 5.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line - From TA 140W to TA 124E, the enemy has been isolated in groups of mangrove and coral caves at intervals along the coast. Balance of enemy occupies the SE point within an area bounded roughly by TA 124A to 123S--114R--113S--106D.

b. Defensive organization - During period, no organized installations were met except pill boxes in TA 106BCDE--107A and along the crest of the ridge extending N from NAFUTAN POINT.

c. Units in contact - No new identifications were made during the period. From all appearances, enemy on the NAFUTAN POINT ridge are making a do or die stand.

d. Artillery - See overlay.

e. Reserves - No reserves possible as all enemy is pocketed on the high ground N of NAFUTAN POINT.

f. Supply establishments. - Additional caves containing ammunition were located along the S shore from TA 104B-105D. Ammunition dump was reported in general area 123FG. Dumps of gas, 8" shells, and grenades found in caves at 117ST.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary - Enemy action continued similar to previous twenty-four (24) hours with gradual withdrawal to high ground N of NAFUTAN POINT. Air observation indicates strong last stand resistance in this area.

b. Operations -

(1) Artillery - Dual purpose gun in action at 123F. 70mm or 75mm artillery fire and heavy mortar fire received from high ground N of NAFUTAN POINT.

(2) Aviation - One air attack received at approximately 1830, 18 June 1944. One plane crash landed at ASLITO Airfield and pilot captured; processed and forwarded to Hq, NLF.

c. Miscellaneous - Land mines reported along the line 123X--114X. Additional mines found along White Beach #1.

d. Pill boxes encountered in TA 106A-E are so constructed that personnel can retire into inner compartments thereby escaping explosion of grenades thrown into pill box openings.

e. A few mines and booby traps reported found on ASLITO Airfield.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. (1) Prisoners - Approximately 400 prisoners have been taken during the period of which two (2) were army and one (1) air force. Among the civilian prisoners were several of Japanese descent clad in light tan uniforms and caps. Generally speaking, they were elderly and stated that they had been "ostracized" from Japan. They were employed as laborers and were allowed no access to military knowledge. They expressed hatred of the Japanese soldier because of treatment received.

(2) Casualties - Same situation as in previous report. Very few enemy dead have been encountered.

b. Morale - Enemy gives impression of a last stand attitude. In one incident, one soldier could be seen loading and firing what appeared to be a 70mm gun by himself.

c. Supply and equipment - Except for ammunition and gas as previously noted, little enemy materiel taken.

d. Enemy controlled terrain - See overlay.

e. Weather and visibility - Excellent throughout period except for dust.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy is capable of making a death stand on the high ground N of NAFUTAN POINT.




b. The enemy is capable of making a counter attack in an attempt to escape from his bottled up position N of NAFUTAN POINT.

c. The enemy is capable of attempting landings along the S and SW shores of the island in an attempt to come in our rear.

d. The enemy is capable of assisting any of the aforesaid capabilities by fire from peninsula N of MAGICIENNE BAY.

Van Antwerp
WM. M. VAN ANTWERP
Lt Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-2

**G-2 SITUATION OVERLAY
TO ACCOMPANY
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT #3
AS OF 181600 TO 191600 JUNE '44
SAIPAN - 1:20,000**



G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1600 19 June 1944
To : 1600 20 June 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div
TA 129K
20 June 1944

No. 4

Maps: SAIPAN, 1/20,000, Sheet No. 5

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line - See attached overlay.

b. Defensive organization - The enemy defensive organization consisted of a number of strong points and there was no definite front line at any period. The system of defense of the enemy seems to be to defend certain local strong points with artillery and mortar fire from NAFUTAN PLATEAU.

Along the south shore of the island were a number of pill boxes and strong points which delayed the advance of the 3rd Bn 105th Inf as each had to be cleaned out individually. In addition in the entire zone of advance of the Division, there are numerous caves and holes in the hills where enemy civilians and military personnel were concealed.

c. Units in contact - Only positive identification - 55th Guard Unit. There are also elements of the TORA Unit which consists mainly of air force personnel connected with ASLITO Airfield. Identifications from documents of forces on SAIPAN were forwarded earlier.

d. Artillery - 70mm HOW artillery has been falling on our troops from positions on the ridge which have been difficult to locate. In the afternoon of the 20th, artillery pieces were wheeled out of a cave in TA 165M and opened fire on our troops. For further positions, see overlay.

e. Reserves - It is believed that there are no reserves available to the enemy in the SE part of SAIPAN as all forces are probably committed in this restricted area.

f. Supply and evacuation establishments - A dump of 20mm and small arms ammunition was captured EAST of the airfield. There are approximately ten 20mm AA guns on airfield with plenty of ammunition. In addition, there are approximately 400 rounds of 4.7 ammunition. There are probably additional supply dumps in the caves in the vicinity of MT. NAFUTAN and along the S shore.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary - At about 2000 19 June, about 75 of the enemy made a disorganized counterattack against the right flank of the 165th Inf. This was turned back by artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire, the area having been lighted by flares. During the remainder of the night, some infiltration was attempted.

Our attack jumped off at 1200 20 June and advanced rapidly as the enemy fought a continued defensive action from various strong points.

b. Operations -

(1) Artillery. - Several field guns from positions noted on overlay fired on our troops. They apparently had previously registered on ridge lines and critical points. During afternoon of the 20th, artillery in caves in PURPLE BEACH area opened fire from the rear on our forces.

c. Miscellaneous -

(1) Additional land mines were reported around the airport and in TA 119L. Booby traps also were found in vicinity of these mines.

(2) Additional horned mines were found on WHITE BEACH #1 as well as booby traps consisting of hand grenades with strings attached.

(3) In areas 123TYE pill boxes were reported which had charged wire around them and some casualties were caused by these.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Prisoners -

(1) One (1) military prisoner connected with the Naval Air Corps was captured. Also, three (3) prisoners were captured along the coast generally in TA 1320. One of these was possibly a military prisoner although they all stated they were Koreans. An attempt was made by using the loud-speaker system to capture more POWs in the general area. It is possible more prisoners can be taken in the caves underneath the cliffs along the shore by using this system. About seventy (70) additional civilians were also taken.

(2) Casualties - No accurate estimate can be given of the enemy dead because of the extremely rugged nature of the terrain and the apparent attempt of the enemy to remove his dead.

b. Morale - Morale apparently continues high. Several of the enemy were observed committing suicide when capture appeared imminent. The enemy seems determined to make a do or die stand on the SE point. Prisoner NAKSHIMA Toshio, is willing to broadcast to any prisoners who are trapped, calling upon them to surrender.

c. Supply and equipment - See 1 (f) above.

d. Terrain not under our control. This terrain is extremely rugged country and is covered by coral rock and dense woods. In the cliffs overlooking the sea and in the mountain areas, are numerous caves and holes. These will continue to make progress slow as each must be carefully examined.

e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation - Enemy observation continues good from the high ground and he is probably familiar with our situation.

f. Weather and visibility - Have continued good and observation has not been restricted.

g. Miscellaneous - During the night of 19-20 June, enemy troops were reported milling around on PURPLE BEACHES #1 and #2. A counterattack or enveloping movement in boats was anticipated, but this did not develop.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy is capable of defending on the high ground in the vicinity with all his forces making a last ditch stand at this point.


b. The enemy is capable of counter attacking at any time and at any place on our front with all forces pinned on NAFUTAN POINT.

c. The enemy is capable of landing along the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST shores of the island moving troops from TINIAN or from the NORTHERN part of SAIPAN.


Van Antwerp
VAN ANTWERP
Lt Colonel
G-2

G-2 SITUATION O'LAY
 TO ACCOMPANY PER. REP'T #4
 AS OF 201600 JUNE 44
 M-27-D

↑
 ARTY PC
 IN TA 165M




03



LEGEND

- 1 BLOCKHOUSE } UNDER ARTY FIRE
- 2 MORTARS }
- 3 8" MORTAR-KNOCKED OUT
- 4 CAVES & PILLBOX



G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1600K 20 June 1944
To : 1600K 21 June 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div
TA 129K
21 June 1944

No. 5

Maps: SAIPAN, 1/20,000, Sheet No. 5.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line - See Overlay.
- b. Defensive organization - Enemy fighting from caves and holes housing machine guns and mortars. Some heavier guns present. Blockhouses.
- c. Units in contact - Enemy personnel appears to be mainly the remnants of the Naval air units from ASLITO FIELD. Estimated 300 to 500 service personnel with a larger number of civilians in addition.
- d. Artillery - Artillery fire was received from a gun concealed in a cave with steel doors at TA 108G.

Field piece observed at TA 108L.

Either artillery or DP guns observed on shore of
MAGICIENNE BAY, in TA 165B,C,D, and TA 176V,W,X. No
observable activity around them.

- e. Reserves - None possible in NAFUTAN POINT area.
 - f. SUPPLY and evacuation dumps - None reported during period.
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary - Minor counter attacks at 2000 and 2200 20 June 1944, were repulsed. During day, 21 June 1944, action of purely defensive nature similar to 20 June.

b. Operations of component elements.-

- (1) Artillery - The field piece located at TA 108G operated from a cave with entrance covered by steel doors. Doors opened, gun was run out and fired, returned to cave, and doors closed.
- (2) Chemical warfare - Enemy in front of 165th Infantry all carried gas masks. POW stated they expected to have gas employed against them.
- (3) Infantry - Increased use of knee mortars and 90mm mortars observed.

c. Miscellaneous -

(1) The three (3) captured 4.7 Jap guns previously reported were used to fire on PURPLE BEACHES during night 20-21 June. Ammunition plentiful.

(2) Land mines were reported at TA 115C. Mines and booby traps were found in pillboxes along shore in TA 106.

(3) Previously reported booby traps on WHITE BEACH #1, made of grenades with strings attached, were examined by an Engineer officer who reports they appear to be a type of grenade carrier consisting of two boards with 5 grenades between them and the boards strapped together with tape.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Enemy casualties.

(1) Approximately 25 dead Japs were counted in the NAFUTAN POINT area.

(2) Indications are that dead have been hauled away and hidden in caves.

(3) Many individuals refused to come out of caves. Caves were blown in making it impossible to even estimate number of dead sealed therein.

(4) In areas TA 128A-E and 129A-D inspection of AA positions disclosed estimated 400-500 dead.

(5) POW's - 22 civilians including one (1) woman who identified herself as a nurse on the plantation. Her husband is in TINIAN where she spent six years. Two (2) naval personnel.

b. Morale -

(1) Do or die attitude still present.

(2) One naval POW gave up due to propaganda leaflets and lack of water. He reported food available.

(3) One (1) civilian committed suicide before our troops could reach him and shouted there is nothing to live for now.

(4) It is believed further use of propaganda leaflets can have success.

c. Supply and equipment -

(1) Two 8" mortars reported in TA 124I can now be definitely identified as such. Division ordnance officer reports barrel 8' long; estimated weight 12-14000 lbs; breech loaded; semi-fixed ammunition; 30-40 lb projectile. Sighting equipment destroyed. Guns in fixed positions.

(2) Large quantity of good 3" AA ammunition found in dump at TA 123G. Fuses removed and stored at airfield by ordnance officer.

(3) Thirteen foot height finder found in TA 123G has been removed to airfield.

d. Terrain not under our control - See overlay. Continues increasingly rugged with more and deeper caves and holes.

e. Enemy's knowledge of our situation - No change.

f. Weather - Two showers during night; fair during day. Visibility good except for dust.

g. Use of interpreters to urge enemy to give up was continued at 1600. no results reported.





h. One POW states that prior to our landing both soldiers and civilians were brought to SAIPAN from TINLAN. Seven hundred were brought to the MAGIC* IENNE BAY area one week prior to our landing. One week prior to our attack, GARAPAN and CHARAN-KANOA were closed to all civilians for approximately one week.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. No change.

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G-2 SITUATION O'LAY
TO ACCOMPANY PER. REPT #5
As of 211600 JUNE 44
H-27-D



G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1600K 21 June 1944
To : 1600K 22 June 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div
TA 129K
22 June 1944

No. 6

Maps: SAIPAN, 1/20,000, Sheet No. 5.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line - See overlay.

b. Defensive organization - Unchanged. Continued defense in caves and holes, using 75mm artillery, mortars and machine guns. Enemy had entrenched in TA 115M-U during night 21-22 June.

c. Units in contact - No change.

d. Artillery - No change in positions since 21 June report

e. Reserves - No change.

f. Supply and evacuation establishments - No change.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Enemy continued "cave" resistance in extremely rugged terrain.

b. Operations of component elements.

(1) Aviation, combat: At approximately 220200 June enemy staged air attack, dropping bombs. None reported as falling in the Division sector.

c. Miscellaneous:

(1) Eight mines previously reported at RJ 196 (TA 122-0) identified as 3" shells sunk in ground. Investigation of fuzes proved that lugs controlling detonation pins had not been removed so shells would have been ineffective. Sample fuzes forwarded to G-2 NLF.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Enemy casualties: 2 enemy army killed in vicinity Division CP.

b. POW: One enemy army private captured in vicinity of Division CP. Sent to NLF. Total at Civilian Stockade:

112 Jap civilians
325 Koreans.

c. Morale - No change.

d. Supply and equipment: Enemy DP of non-usable items including bombs, torpedo heads, etc., were blown by Division demolition group in TA 130 at 221520 June.

e. Terrain not under our control: Rugged cave pocked area as shown on overlay.

f. Enemy knowledge of our situation: Unchanged.

g. Weather and visibility: Brief shower during night 21-22 June. Balance of period, fair. Visibility clear except for dust.

h. Miscellaneous:

(1) During day 22 June interpreters urged occupants of caves to surrender with no success. During PM loud speaker system installed in tank was employed.

(2) Majority of leaflets dropped during afternoon 21 June fell in sea or on our troops.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Enemy bottled in NAFUTAN PT area are capable of

(1) Fighting to death.

(2) Staging final all out counterattack to escape from area.

(3) Infiltrating thru our lines in attempt to escape.

(4) Attempting to escape by sea to MAGICIENNE BAY area.

b. Enemy is capable of landing forces on south of island to disrupt our supply establishments.

c. Enemy is capable of landing troops in SOUTH MAGICIENNE BAY area for same purpose as b.

Van Antwerp
VAN ANTWERP
Lt Colonel
G-2

16

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09

13

NO CHANGES IN
INSTALLATIONS
FROM REPORT
OF 21 JUNE '44

G-2 SITUATION OVERLAY
TO ACCOMPANY
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT # 6
AS OF 221600 JUNE '44
SAIPAN 1:20,000
H-27-D

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 221600 June 1944
To : 231600 June 1944

Hq 27th Inf Div
TA 129K
23 June 1944

No. 7

Maps: SAIPAN, 1/20,000, Sheets 3 and 5.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line - See overlay (atchd).
- b. Defensive organization - Enemy is defending in caves and on cliffs in very rugged mountain terrain.
- c. Units in contact - Only identification is of 1st Bn 118th Inf from a document on dead soldier found in rear of 106th Inf front line. Rapid Fire Gun Platoon, 3rd Bn 89th Inf identified by document found in TA 104W.
- d. Artillery - No report.
- e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention - Are still reported in vicinity of CHATCHA Village.
- f. Supply and evacuation establishments - Captured Jap map showing what are believed to be food DP's forwarded to G-2 NTLF. Supply dump located in TA 212TY - TA 213PU partially destroyed by arty fire. Many supplies of unknown class remain.

2. ENEMY OPERATION DURING PERIOD.

- a. Enemy continued a stubborn defense with machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire. ID assigned to Division was found to be in enemy hands when this Division relieved the 4th MarDiv in its zone of advance. A strong point at TA 184W held up the advance of the 106th Inf. 2nd Bn 105th Inf, in MT NAFUTAN area was released from Division control and put under Corps command.
- b. AA Arty - Fired on Arty observation plane.
- c. Arty - About 12 rounds including many duds of what is believed to be 75mm or 3" fell at 0500 in immediate vicinity of Division CP (129K). Fragments sent to G-2 NLF.
- d. Aviation, combat - One Blue alert at 2400, 22 June. No bombs dropped in Division Area.
- e. Tanks - Enemy medium tank found in TA 162-0. Appeared to have been used as pillbox. Armament estimated as 57mm gun.
- f. Miscellaneous - Magnetic mines found in case at TA 162-0.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Estimated enemy casualties, including prisoners: No estimate of enemy casualties:

3 military POW's (evacuated to Corps POW cage).

Revised figure POW cage:

149 Jap civilian

291 Korean

Hospital cases, 5 unidentified

All military POW's evacuated.

b. Morale - Nothing upon which a change can be reported.

c. Supply and equipment - None.

d. Terrain not under our control - Extremely rugged with sheer cliffs and many caves. Will probably continue to get more difficult in the advance NORTH to the O-5 line.

e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation: Enemy observation continues good. Part of SOI lost by A Co. 105th Inf on man who is missing in action in vicinity ASLITO Airfield.

f. Weather and visibility - Continues good during day except for dust.

g. Additional report of use of loudspeaker system in caves on SOUTH coast not available as yet but it is possible that the enemy has moved from the caves where the attempt was made.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.



a. The enemy is capable of continuing his defense in the MT TAPOTCHAU area using all forces remaining on island.

b. The enemy is capable of falling back to previously prepared positions in the mountain area at any time taking advantage of the extremely difficult terrain and fighting a delaying action on successive lines.

c. The enemy is capable of reinforcing his forces on SAIPAN by barge from TINIAN under cover of darkness.

d. The enemy is capable of counter attacking from the high ground on our front at any time with forces of unknown strength.

Van Antwerp
VAN ANTWERP
Lt. Colonel
G-2



G-2 SITUATION O'LAY
 TO ACCOMPANY PER. REP'T # 7
 SAIPAN - 1:20,000
 AS OF 231600 JUNE '44
 H-27-D